On October 31, 2025 — the Veles Night — the High Anti-Corruption Court concluded the trial of former State Fiscal Service chief Roman Nasirov, sentencing him to six years in prison, a fine of UAH 17,000, and a three-year ban on holding public office. However, the HACC acquitted Nasirov’s alleged accomplice, Volodymyr Novikov, and dismissed the civil claim filed by Ukrgazvydobuvannya for UAH 44.8 million.
The case of Nasirov, the former head of the SFS, is among the most notorious high-level corruption cases of the past decade. He was accused of unlawfully granting tax deferrals to companies linked to fugitive ex-MP Oleksandr Onyshchenko and his so-called “gas scheme”, which allegedly cost the state budget nearly UAH 3 billion.
Although the full text of the verdict has not yet been published, this article, based on publicly available information presented during court hearings, explains what exactly Nasirov was charged with, why the case dragged on for so long, and what its implications may be.
Nasirov’s role in the Onyshchenko scheme
The Nasirov episode in Onyshchenko’s “gas case” is one of its key elements because, according to the prosecution, the former SFS head caused the greatest damage — UAH 2 billion.
The NABU and the SAPO established that between January 2013 and June 2016, then-MP Oleksandr Onyshchenko, deputy head of the parliamentary committee on fuel and energy, decided to exploit his position by organizing a scheme to buy state-produced gas at below-market prices and resell it at full market value.
At the time, Onyshchenko controlled Nadra Heotsentr LLC, Firm Khas LLC, and Karpatnadrainvest LLC, which cooperated with Ukrgazvydobuvannya PJSC. In its verdict (later annulled by the HACC Appeals Chamber on procedural grounds and sent for retrial), the court found that the fugitive ex-MP had created a criminal organization through which Ukrgazvydobuvannya sold extracted gas at artificially low prices to pre-selected companies, which then resold it at market rates. The difference between the purchase and resale prices generated over UAH 500 million in profit for members of Onyshchenko’s group. For the scheme to run smoothly, however, it also required “the right kind of tax support.” That is where the central figure of this story came in — Roman Nasirov, the head of the SFS.
The pre-trial investigation into Nasirov began in March 2017. According to the prosecution, after his appointment as SFS chief in 2015, Onyshchenko relied on his “tax services” for nearly two years.
The NABU and the SAPO maintain that Nasirov approved over 300 decisions granting deferrals for UAH 103 million in tax obligations and debts owed by Onyshchenko-linked companies without any legal basis. This allowed payment of those liabilities to be continuously postponed without penalties or interest.

To create artificial grounds for these decisions, Nasirov directly exercised his powers. According to the NABU and the SAPO, the then-SFS head personally and possibly through subordinates from the SFS Debt Repayment Department, including acquitted official Volodymyr Novikov and former department head Liudmyla Solotva (who faces separate proceedings still under trial), gave unlawful instructions to the heads of regional SFS offices in Kharkiv, Poltava, and Dnipropetrovsk regions.
Notably, the HACC acquitted Novikov, finding no evidence of aiding and abetting abuse of office under Article 364 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine during his tenure as director of the SFS Debt Repayment Department.
How did the debt-deferral scheme work?
Based on SAPO’s statements in court and NABU’s public materials, the alleged multi-billion-hryvnia abuse scheme orchestrated by Nasirov may have functioned as follows.
Falsifying financial data. Throughout 2015, Nasirov’s subordinates submitted false information about the supposed bankruptcy risks of Onyshchenko-affiliated companies. In reality, there was no such threat: these companies were purchasing state gas at cost price, while their tax debts kept rising. Reports deliberately omitted existing deferrals and ignored deadlines for paying tax arrears — in direct violation of the law.
Artificially creating debt and issuing new deferrals. When the payment deadline for second-quarter 2015 taxes expired, those unpaid amounts became full-fledged tax debts. The companies then filed new applications for deferral to avoid penalties and interest. To make these actions appear lawful despite missed deadlines, officials backdated the starting dates of all financial transactions.
Preparing unlawful conclusions. Following Nasirov’s instructions, territorial SFS offices baselessly prepared positive conclusions supporting deferrals. After receiving these falsified documents, Nasirov approved deferrals for Nadra Heocenter LLC, Karpatnadrainvest LLC, and Firm Khas LLC. Investigators believe these actions violated the law and caused losses to the state budget.
Changing payment terms. In December 2015, Nasirov ordered regional SFS branches to amend the deferral conditions. In breach of the law, he postponed payment deadlines to January 1, 2016. Two subsequent forensic economic examinations confirmed that from May 2015 to March 2016, these allegedly unlawful decisions by Nasirov could have led the state to lose over UAH 2 billion in revenue.
Suspicion + interim measure = Feofania
On March 2, 2017, Roman Nasirov was served with a notice of suspicion of abuse of office — not in an office or courtroom, but right inside Feofania hospital, where the former SFS chief had been hospitalized, allegedly due to a heart attack, which later turned out to be false. Then-NABU Director Artem Sytnyk warned Nasirov of the consequences of feigning illness, while his lawyers claimed that the suspicion had been served illegally because their client was unconscious.
A few days later, the court was to select an interim measure, but the most memorable moment came not from the ruling itself — rather, from the legendary “magic blanket” episode, when Nasirov was carried from Feofania to the courtroom wrapped in a checkered hospital blanket and spent nearly the entire hearing covered by it. His dramatic “treatment” delayed the imposition of an interim measure beyond the 72-hour legal limit, meaning that, technically, Nasirov could have simply walked free. However, activists blocked the courtroom exits, forcing him to spend the night there. Eventually, the court ordered detention with an option for release on bail, set at UAH 100 million.

Seven months later, the investigation was completed, and on November 10, 2017, the case against Nasirov and his alleged accomplice Novikov was transferred to the Shevchenkivskyi District Court of Kyiv.
From the Shevchenkivskyi Court to the HACC
The district court needed less than two weeks to resolve procedural matters and, on December 7, 2017, began the trial on the merits. That’s when the delays started.
The court spent almost two years hearing the case against the former SFS head. For much of that time, the prosecutor was forced to read aloud all 774 pages of the indictment, as Nasirov’s defense insisted on a full reading. To make matters worse, hearings were rare, and even after two years the indictment still wasn’t fully read. Notably, in 2019, amendments to Ukraine’s Criminal Procedure Code eliminated this procedural loophole used to stall trials.
In 2018, the defense tried to shift responsibility for the tax deferrals granted to Onyshchenko’s companies — from Nasirov himself to regional tax officials — through the infamous District Administrative Court of Kyiv. However, the Supreme Court overturned that decision, ruling that there could be no dispute between the SFS and its head over who had authority to grant tax deferrals, since the service exercises its powers through its head — Nasirov — not independently.

Interestingly, in 2019, despite being criminally prosecuted, Nasirov ran for President of Ukraine as an independent candidate. He managed to collect the signatures of over 2,500 citizens, though he ended up at the bottom of the race — seemingly an attempt to gain immunity through the presidential campaign.
In October 2019, the case was transferred to the newly established High Anti-Corruption Court, which was required to begin hearings de novo on November 8, 2019. That same day, the case was scheduled for trial on the merits. Thanks to the aforementioned procedural changes, the prosecutor was able to present only a brief version of the indictment, which took just ten minutes to read.
However, any hopes for a swift trial quickly faded — the defense resumed its well-worn obstruction tactics, filing baseless motions to recuse judges and prosecutors, skipping hearings without justification, and withdrawing defense lawyers at critical moments.
For example, in May 2020, the court had to postpone yet another hearing because the defense lawyer for Novikov missed three sessions in a row. Novikov then refused his lawyer’s services without hiring a new one, forcing the court to appoint a state-funded public defender. At times, Nasirov himself failed to appear, citing hospitalization at the familiar Feofania due to exacerbation of chronic conditions. The court, however, did not consider those excuses valid.
The process was further bogged down by a stream of procedural motions and postponements due to defense absences, which continued right up until deliberation. The closer the court came to a verdict, the more aggressively Nasirov and his lawyers used delay tactics.
An especially absurd episode occurred in August, when defense lawyer Kostiantyn Doroshenko failed to appear once again, and Nasirov himself demanded to postpone five consecutive hearings due to his lawyer’s vacation and other “commitments.” The judge objected but ultimately had to reschedule them.
Another staged performance followed — Nasirov’s “refusal” of his own lawyer, the same Doroshenko. Nasirov claimed they had “significant and irreconcilable differences” and that he could not proceed with final arguments without a new defender, requesting time to find one. Yet, on that very same day, another hearing was held in a separate case — concerning a multi-million hryvnia bribe from Bakhmatiuk — where Doroshenko continued to represent Nasirov without any differences whatsoever. Even after delivering his final statement, Nasirov still had Doroshenko beside him, continuing his defense as though nothing had happened.
In his nearly ten-hour-long closing speech, Nasirov petitioned the court to return to the initial stage of evidence examination — a move widely seen as another attempt to delay proceedings.
In total, the Nasirov case was heard in the HACC for six years, and about two more years before that in the Shevchenkivskyi District Court.
TI Ukraine closely monitored the case and found that deliberate delays, constant adjournments, and endless procedural wrangling severely undermined the trial’s progress. According to our data, only in May 2024 did the HACC finally complete the examination of evidence and proceed to witness questioning. Interrogation of the defendants alone lasted almost a year — from July 2024 to February 2025. During the final debates, Nasirov himself took the floor at 13 consecutive hearings from June to late October 2025.
Nasirov’s failed attempt to “mobilize”
Nasirov’s efforts to delay the proceedings were not limited to recusals and dismissals of defense lawyers. On April 9, 2025, TI Ukraine’s court monitoring team learned that two days earlier, the former tax chief had volunteered to join Ukraine’s Defense Forces.
At first glance, the decision might have appeared patriotic and brave. Yet the timing was more than telling — the trial was nearing its final stage, with closing arguments underway and the defendant’s final statement still to come. Throughout previous hearings, the defense had repeatedly cited Nasirov’s “poor health” as a reason for delays.
In reality, joining the military could have legally suspended the trial until his release from service — and perhaps even helped him evade accountability altogether. But things did not go as planned. Late in the night of April 10, the Military Law Enforcement Service reported that the commander had declared Nasirov’s draft order unlawful, revoked it, and forwarded all materials to law enforcement for further review.
By the next morning, the accused was already back at the High Anti-Corruption Court, attending a hearing in another criminal case — this time on one of the largest alleged bribes in Ukraine’s history, totaling UAH 722 million. His defense team had earlier filed motions to suspend that trial due to his “mobilization,” but at the start of the hearing they withdrew them, saying there was no need to consider those requests.
What are the prospects for the case?
The guilty verdict delivered on October 31, 2025, is already a major milestone. However, this is not yet the end — the ruling will only take effect after the appeal process concludes.
Nasirov’s lawyers have already announced their intention to appeal, and while appellate proceedings drag on, the statute of limitations will continue to run out.
From April 2026, the case will be at serious risk of closure, since the limitation period for the main offense under Article 364(2) of the Criminal Code of Ukraine is 10 years. Given that the alleged criminal acts occurred in 2016, the term may expire within five to six months, allowing Nasirov to petition for release from criminal liability.
This is not without precedent. Due to earlier delays, in September 2023, the HACC was already forced to release Nasirov from liability for forgery in office (Article 366 of the Criminal Code) after the three-year limitation period had expired.
This raises a serious risk that his guilt (or innocence) will never be conclusively established, and the state will be unable to recover its losses. Only a swift appellate review — within five months or less — could prevent the case from collapsing.
TI Ukraine hopes that the “gas case” against Nasirov will reach a logical and just conclusion, and that the progress made over more than eight years of litigation will not be lost to procedural games.
The case involving tax deferrals that Nasirov allegedly granted is one of the landmark cases in the history of Ukraine’s anti-corruption infrastructure.
It has drawn public attention ever since that memorable night when activists prevented the former SFS head from escaping the Shevchenkivskyi Court during his bail hearing. The scale of damage that, according to the SAPO, Nasirov’s scheme inflicted on the state only reinforces the public demand for a final, fair court decision.
*The “gas case” of Onyshchenko is not the only one involving Roman Nasirov. The HACC is also currently hearing another criminal proceeding in which the former SFS head is accused of accepting one of the largest alleged bribes in Ukraine’s history — UAH 722 million — in exchange for VAT refunds worth over UAH 540 million to agroholding companies owned by businessman Oleh Bakhmatiuk. That trial remains ongoing, with evidence currently being examined. Still, it is the “gas case” that has made Nasirov a household name across the country.
Author: Andrii Tkachuk, Legal Advisor at Transparency International Ukraine